Issues of interest Vol. 46, December 1994 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
JI 
&Nfh~E 
OFB.C. 
ISSUES OF INTEREST 
VOLUME NO. 46 
POLICE ACADEMY 
4180 West 4th Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6R 4J5 
ISSUES OF INTEREST 
VOLUME NO. 46 
Written by John M. Post 
December, 1994 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INCEST AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
REGINA v. M.S. - Vancouver Registry, CC 930288, BC Supreme Court, 
Page# 
February, 1994 . . . . . ..... . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
CAN A PERSON BE CONVICTED OF ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT OF 
A CRIME WHERE THE PRINCIPAL OFFENDER WAS NOT CONVICTED 
DUE TO THE CROWN ENTERING A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS? 
REGINA v. CAMPONI - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 506. Court of Appeal for BC . . . . . . . 3 
DONATING H.l.V. CONTAMINATED BLOOD TO 
RED CROSS - PUBLIC NUISANCE 
REGINA v. THORNTON - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 530. Supreme Court of Canada 5 
ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED STATEMENTS BY UNDERAGE 
WITNESS - S. 715 .1 C.C. 
REGINA v. JFA - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 295. Ontario Court of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . 7 
"OBVIOUS POLICE 'SCHEME' TO AVOID PROTECTION GIVEN TO SUSPECTS". 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE THEREBY OBTAINED 
REGINA v. NOVAK, VUKELICH AND GORSEK - Supreme Court of BC, 
New Westminster X036442. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
MUST UNDER-AGED WITNESS WHO GAVE STATEMENT IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH S. 715.1 C.C. BE ABLE TO RECALL EVENTS OF OFFENCE WHEN 
TESTIFYING? 
REGINA v. TOTEN - 83 C.C. C. (3d) 5 Ontario Court of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
YOUTHS IN POSSESSION OF GOODS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN STOLEN -
OBJECTIVE GROUNDS, AND SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS OF THOSE GROUNDS -
LAWFULNESS OF ARREST - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. T.A.C. - H.J.E.S. - W.S.L. (Y.O.A.) - BC Court of Appeal, 
Vancouver CA017291 , July, 1994. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
SELF DEFENCE - IMMINENCE OF HARM - APPREHENSION OF FUTURE HARM -
- EXCESSIVE FORCE - RETREAT 
REGINA v. LAVALLEE [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 - Volume 38, page 9 of this publication; 
REGINA v. PETEL - [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3; REGINA v. IRWIN - Court of Appeal for BC, 
Victoria, V01720 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
APPLICATION AND LIMITATION OF RULE OF EVIDENCE 
KNOWN A "RECENT POSSESSION" 
REGINA v. SAUNDERS - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver, CA017540, 
June 1994. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
"THE DIARRHOEA DEFENCE" 
REGINA v. POWELL - BC Provincial Court - Delta File #19853 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
OFFICER CONDUCTING WARRANTLESS SEARCH - RELIANCE 
ON A PRECEDENT UNDER APPEAL - PRECEDENT REVERSED 
"GOOD FAITH" ON THE PART OF THE OFFICERS 
REGINA v. SENEY - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 013504 . . . . . . . 31 
OFFICERS LACKING BELIEF THAT THEY HAVE GROUNDS 
TO EFFECT AN ARREST. ACCUSED SEARCHED BEFORE ARREST -
UNREASONABLE SEARCH - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. HARPAL SINGH THANDI - Court of Appeal for BC, 
Vancouver CA 017451 .. .. . . .. .. ........... .. . . . . ....... .. .. 35 
DEFENCE OF POLICE HARASSMENT TO SPEEDING 
REGINA v. LANGSTON - BC Court of Appeal, Vancouver CC 931699. . . . . . 37 
DEFENCE APPLICATION FOR INFORMER'S CRIMINAL RECORD 
TO TEST VALIDITY OF NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT SEARCH WARRANT 
REGINA v. KELLY - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC 930757 . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
POLICE ARRESTING ACCUSED IN VAN REPORTED 
TO BE INVOLVED IN COCAINE TRAFFICKING -
LAWFULNESS OF ARREST 
REGINA v. RIMMER - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 016819, 
April 22, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
WILDLIFE OFFICER STOPPING VEHICLE AND QUESTIONING 
OCCUPANTS - CHARTER VIOLATIONS - ADMISSIBILITY 
OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. MEISE - BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry 25345, April 19943 
ROADSIDE SCREENING DEVICE TEST -
VALUE AND VALIDITY OF DEMAND IF NO DETERMINATION 
WAS MADE REGARDING ALCOHOL IN THE SUSPECT'S MOUTH 
REGINA v. KEAN - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC 931164 . . . . . . . . . 45 
POLICE ATTENDING AT THE HOME OF THE REGISTERED OWNER 
OF CAR INVOLVED IN A SUSPECTED IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENCE -
NOT UNREASONABLE SEARCH -
REGINA v. JOHNSON - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA016210, 
April 1994 ... . .................... ....... .... ..... .... ... 47 
IS A "FIREARM" ALWAYS INCLUDED IN THE 
DEFINITION OF WEAPON? 
REGINA v. FELEWKA - [1993] 4. S.C.R. 199. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
INFORMATION AND SURVEILLANCE GIVING GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING 
PERSONS ATTENDING AN APARTMENT COME OUT POSSESSING MARIHUANA 
VALIDITY OF ARREST OF SUCH PERSON 
REGINA v. ENNS - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA017082, April 1994. 53 
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EFFECTING ARREST OF ????? AND THREATENING 
SEARCH LAWFULNESS OF ARREST - REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH 
REGINA v. LEJEUNESSE - Vancouver Registry, CA 017452 - BC Court of Appeal, 
May 1994. . ....... . .................. . .......... .. ... . . . 55 
"DETENTION" AT BORDER CROSSINGS 
REGINA v. HARDY - BC Supreme Court - Vancouver, C.C. 933 1374, April 199457 
ADEQUACY OF POLICE WARNING FOR DRINKING DRIVING 
REGINA v. KOZAK - BC Supreme Court, Victoria, 73036-T, May 1994 . . . . . 59 
FOREIGN POLICE ARRESTING AND INTERVIEWING ACCUSED ON BEHALF AND 
REQUEST OF CANADIAN POLICE - TRIAL IN CANADA - APPLICATION OF CHARTER -
ADMISSIBILITY OF INCULPATORY STATEMENT -
REGINA v. TERRY - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 0 13910, June 1994.61 
DEFENCE OF THIRD PARTY HAVING INFLICTED INJURIES AND EVIDENCE OF 
PROPENSITY OF THE THIRD PARTY - EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF FLIGHT 
REGINA v. ARCANGIOLI - [1 994] 1 Supreme Court Reports 129. . . . . . . . . . 63 
TIO BITS 
POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT SUITABLE TO BREAK INTO AREAS 
Regina v. Wilkinson - Vancouver CA 018174, June 1994. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
REMEDY TO LACK OF FULL DISCLOSURE 
Regina v. J.S.H. - 83 C.C.C. (3d) 572, Alberta Court of Appeal . . . . . . . . . . 65 
INCEST AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
_REGINA v. M.S. - Vancouver Registry, CC 930288, BC Supreme Court, February, 
1994 
The accused was charged with having committed incest by having sexual intercourse 
with his biological daughter who was an adult at the time of the alleged offence. In 
response to the charge the accused challenged the constitutional validity of s. 155 
C.C. which prohibits incest. He reasoned that the criminal sanction against two 
related consenting adults is creating a victimless offence. The crime of incest in such 
circumstances infringes the freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, 
belief, opinion and expression; and freedom of association. Furthermore he argued 
that the section is ultra vires Federal Government as the matter belongs under family 
rather than criminal law. 
The Court responded that incest did have an appropriate place in criminal law. Incest 
is just not a social taboo. The genetic risks are phenomenal as are the social and 
psychological consequences. Often the consent to the sexual intercourse is 
questionable in terms of true consent. Frequently there is a dominance involved by 
a father over his daughter that does not cease at a given age. Many of these 
relationships are exploitive and harmful. 
The accused also argued that the Criminal Law of Canada provides protection for 
children under the authority of adults from sexual exploitation by those adults. When 
the children become of age they are protected by the assault provisions in our criminal 
law. This makes the incest prohibition superfluous and not rationally connected to its 
objective. The Court responded that there is a distinct difference between consent 
and acquiescence when it comes to a father and daughter of any age. Furthermore 
this argument does not include the progeny affects of incest as a reason for its 
prohibition. 
In terms of the law prohibiting incest, the accused argued that it found its roots in 
church dogma and should not be part of public law as it interferes with the freedom 
of religion. The Court rejected this submission. Many prohibitions imposed by the 
Church are similar to public prohibitions but are each for different reasons and subject 
to totally different validity tests. The offending fathers are not in any way interfered 
with by the public incest prohibition to exercise any religion they wish. 
The incest prohibition infringes the freedom of a father to "express" feelings between 
him and his adult consenting daughter. This is an intrusion into his Charter freedom 
of expression. The Court agreed that the incest prohibition limits the freedom of 
expression but that restriction is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society (s. 1 Charter). 
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The freedom of association includes "intimate" association argued the accused. The 
Crown had contended that this Charter freedom only refers to association with 
peaceful assemblies and organizations. However, the Court found that should 
intimate association be included then incest prohibitions are still justified bys. 1 of the 
Charter. 
Finally, the accused submitted that the incest prohibition impairs the right to life, 
liberty and security of consenting adults merely on the basis of status - their blood 
relatedness. As an example he used his anxiety over these pending criminal 
accusations and proceedings. The Court observed that this was unrelated to the 
validity of the incest prohibition. Should the period be excessive, the law provides for 
a remedy; a judicial stay of proceedings. 
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The petition of the 
accused was dismissed. 
S. 155 C.C. is valid law. 
CAN A PERSON BE CONVICTED OF ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT OF 
A CRIME WHERE THE PRINCIPAL OFFENDER WAS NOT CONVICTED 
DUE TO THE CROWN ENTERING A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS? 
REGINA v. CAMPONI - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 506. Court of Appeal for BC. 
The accused and Gee, the man she lived with, entered a neighbouring apartment with 
the intent to rob Mr. May who was rumoured to carry thousands of dollars on his 
person. Gee hit the victim over the head with a bottle and when the accused made 
Gee aware that May was still alive he stabbed him three times in the chest. May only 
had $200.00 on him which Gee took. 
The accused cleaned up Gee'~ clothes, his knife and the bottle. She removed 
fingerprints, disposed of incriminating articles in the garbage container and removed 
splatters of blood in the apartment. She then phoned the ambulance telling the 
dispatcher that she had found Mr. May in this condition when she entered his 
apartment to complain about her toilet flooding. All of this information and the 
accused's actions were learned from her telling an undercover investigator these 
details and a confession from Gee. 
Gee's confession was ruled inadmissible in evidence when he was tried for murder 
and the Crown had then entered a stay of proceedings. This caused defence counsel 
to argue that the accused could not be prosecuted for being an accessory after the 
fact to a murder committed by Gee unless Gee was convicted of that murder. The 
trial judge disagreed and the accused was convicted. She appealed this verdict to the 
BC Court of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeal held that the Crown had proved the accessoryship alleged. The 
accused had knowledge of the circumstances in which the person she assisted to 
escape detection and conviction, was a party to the murder. Therefore the offence 
of accessory is free standing. If this was not so then the more successful the 
perpetrator is in meeting the very objective of the offence (to help a person escape 
criminal prosecution by rendering assistance and comfort) the more immune he 
becomes. 
Safe, perhaps, where the principal offender was acquitted on the merits can another 
person not be convicted of being an accessory after the fact to the offence the 
principal offender was alleged to have committed. However, there was no acquittal 
involved here. 
Appeal dismissed, 
Conviction upheld. 
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DONATING H.l.V. CONTAMINATED BLOOD TO 
RED CROSS - PUBLIC NUISANCE 
REGINA v. THORNTON - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 530. Supreme Court of Canada 
To test the system and see if he could "get away with it", the accused, knowing that 
he tested HIV positive, did nevertheless donate blood to the Red Cross . He knew that 
his blood could cause Aids and would be used for transfusions by the medical 
services. Consequently the accused was convicted of "having committed a common 
nuisance" by not informing the Red Cross that his blood was contaminated with HIV 
antibodies. He thereby had endangered the lives and health of the public. He 
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.). 
The accused argued that his conduct did not amount to an offence known to law. 
The offence of common nuisance is defined ins. 180 C.C. and specifically states that 
the endangering of lives or health must be done by "an unlawful act" or "failing to 
discharge a legal duty" . There simply was no law the accused violated by donating 
his blood and consequently the focus of this case is the "legal duty" on the accused 
in these circumstances. The accused's blood had been eliminated in the Red Cross 
testing program, he knew not to be full-proof. 
The S.C.C. weighed this case on the basis of the well known phrase that the biblical 
commandment to love your neighbour is in human made law "You must not injure 
your neighbour". Unless statute or common law provides otherwise we are not under 
any legal obligation to stand on guard for our fellowman. However, we must not 
commit an act to injure someone else. To refrain from doing so is a duty imposed by 
common law. Furthermore, s. 216 C.C. imposes a duty on us in these circumstances. 
The applicable portion of the section provides that everyone is under a "legal duty" 
to use reasonable care when administering medical treatment to or commit any other 
lawful act that may endanger the life of another person. This duty the accused 
blatantly failed to meet. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction Upheld . 
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ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED STATEMENTS BY UNDERAGE 
WITNESS - S. 715.1 C.C. 
REGINA v. JFA - 82 C.C.C. (3d) 295. Ontario Court of Appeal 
An eight year old was allegedly sexually assaulted by her father. The girl's 
stepmother took her to the police and a statement from the girl was videotaped and 
adduced in evidence at the accused's trail for sexual assault. The admissibility of the 
content of the tape became an issue. The tape was admitted by the trial judge and 
the accused was convicted. The case then was appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. 
The stepmother had been present during the taping and on several occasions she had 
answered questions the police interviewer directed at her. On at least one occasion 
she prompted the girl's response to a question directed at the girl. All of this dialogue 
included the stepmother's observations of the girl as well as conversations she had 
with her. All of this led to the interviewer asking the girl if she had been assaulted by 
the accused on other occasions. The girl then described certain incidents. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the tape should not have been admitted in 
evidence. The Court held that the words "the acts complained of" in s. 715.1 C.C. 
means the acts encompassed by the indictment. The girl's description of other 
incidents with the accused was at best "similar fact" evidence which cannot be 
adduced by means of s. 715.1 C.C. Any utterances by the stepmother were 
inadmissible and contaminated the interview and its evidentiary value. 
Accused's appeal allowed. 
New Trial ordered. 
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"OBVIOUS POLICE 'SCHEME' TO AVOID PROTECTION GIVEN TO SUSPECTS". 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE THEREBY OBTAINED 
REGINA v. NOVAK, VUKELICH AND GORSEK - Supreme Court of BC, New 
Westminster X036442. 
A municipal police officer testified that a source informed him that the three accused, 
one of which had been the target of police investigations in the officer's municipality, 
were hydroponically cultivating marijuana in the house they occupied in another 
municipality some distance away. That municipality is policed by the RCMP. The 
power needed for this operation was, according to the informer, stolen from BC Hydro 
by means of by-passing the meter. The officer failed to classify the credibility of the 
informer. 
On the 2nd of September the officer drove in the company of the informer, 
approximately 65 km to the home of the accused. He testified that while the informer 
went for a walk he viewed from the road, the house and its immediate surroundings. 
He told the Court that he could see a Camero automobile with four flat tires and that 
he "had received or was able to obtain" its licence number. The car was registered 
in the name of one of the accused. The officer further testified that on that day the 
informer told him that the theft of electricity was not to grow marijuana but tomatoes. 
The officer testified further the he had, as a drug section head, not paid any attention 
to the investigation's file. One of the section members had contacted the RCMP 
subdivision in which the house is situated. That member had told him that they "had 
showed little or no interest". The officer told the Court that he had not been able to 
ignore the theft and had to, "in some fashion or another", deal with the investigation. 
Due to the duty the law imposed on him he continued the investigation of theft of 
electricity from BC Hydro. Mr. Novak as well as the theft were his interest, he told 
the Court. 
On the 10th of September the officer in the company of another drug section member 
again drove to the house. This time he was able to take a picture of two of the 
accused leaving the place. 
On the 11th of September, according to the officer's testimony, he involved the BC 
Hydro Security Service and reported the theft investigation to them. On the 14th a 
Hydro Investigator, Mr. K., was assigned to assist the officer. On the 15th of 
September this investigator met the officer at the home and took a reading of the flow 
of electricity at the pole and it was found to be so abnormally high that there was a 
safety concern. In the sincere belief that Mr. K. had the right to enter the property 
without a warrant to examine the use of Corporation equipment and the use of 
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electricity, he did so to examine the meter. The use of electricity the meter indicated 
was far less than the electricity flow measured at the pole. Mr. K. while on the 
property found several other abnormalities indicating theft of electricity. The 
Municipal Officer testified that at this point he contacted the regional RCMP drug 
section. He was referred to a detachment, but he found there was no interest in the 
investigation. He then contacted his own department and proceeded to obtain a 
search warrant regarding the theft of electricity. When the officer arrived back at the 
scene nine police officers and two Hydro investigators were waiting for him. After 
a discussion, the police officers telling the Hydro people to stay on the road, attended 
at the home. As no one answered the door it was opened with a battering ram. A 
cursory look-around revealed the presence of a large quantity of marijuana. All 
officers immediately left the home and a warrant underthe Narcotics Control Act was 
obtained. A plethora of exhibits were seized indicating extensive growing of 
marijuana for some time. The admissibility of these exhibits became the subject of 
a voire dire when the three accused were jointly tried for cultivating and possessing 
marijuana as well as theft of electricity from the BC Hydro Corporation. 
What was on trial during the voire dire was the credibility of the authorities and 
particularly that of the municipal police officer. The Court held that the officer's 
testimony was "unacceptable". All through the reasons for judgement, criticism and 
cynicism of the officer's actions and veracity was blatantly obvious. 
In terms of the officer's reason to continue an investigation into theft of electricity to 
grow tomatoes, miles away from his bailiwick, was not believed. He undoubtedly felt 
the accused Novak was involved in growing marijuana and he was determined to 
uncover his operation. 
The officer's testimony about observing the Camero and noting the licence number 
was evidence of one of the accused living at the house. What he testified to have 
observed from the road, the Court did not believe. The officer was unable to see the 
licence number of the car or that the tires were flat from where he said he stood. The 
Court was "satisfied" that instead of a walk up the road, the informer walked up to 
the house and got the information the officer wanted, and actually became thereby 
an agent. 
The Court also had "some problem" with the officer's testimony that he had notified 
the local RCMP. They told the Court that they knew nothing of the investigation until 
the day of the search. Furthermore, reasoned the Court, why notify the drug squad 
if you believe only tomatoes are being grown in the house? 
The officer had also testified that he informed the BC Hydro Security Services 
supervisor on September 11. The testimony of this supervisor was somewhat 
perplexing, said the Court, as he testified to have been made aware of the 
10 
investigation and alleged theft of electricity on September 3rd by one of his own 
investigators. He (the supervisor) had then contacted the officer who had said that 
he did not have time to assist him. Also of interest was the supervisor's testimony 
that BC Hydro conducts its own investigations in regard to theft of electricity without 
assistance of police. The supervisor answered in cross-examination that if he had 
been in need of assistance he would have contacted the local RCMP detachment. 
Also perplexing was the fact that where the Court was to believe that only the theft 
of electricity was being investigated, police left the experts in this field, standing on 
the road. The personnel notified of the search were drug-section people; the amount 
of manpower (all drug investigators) that carried out the search; and the use of the 
battering ram, were not consistent with investigating a by-pass of a hydro meter to 
grow tomatoes miles away from main investigator's jurisdiction. 
The Hydro investigator, Mr. K's evidence was not believed either. He maintained not 
to have had any indication that the investigation was regarding the cultivation of 
marijuana. He had worked with the officer quite frequently. He knew he was a drug-
officer who was quite outside his territory. Furthermore, if as Mr. K. had testified the 
flow of electricity to the house was such that it was a safety problem he would 
undoubtedly shut it off as he is authorized to do in the circumstances. He is assumed 
to have left matters as they were as he did not want to jeopardize the officer's 
investigation of which "he was specifically unaware". 
In regard to Mr. K's authority to conduct a warrantless search of private property, the 
Court held that in the circumstances he did not have that power. Firstly there was 
no need for him to make the search for the evidence he found. An alternative means 
of obtaining the grounds for the search warrant was to compare the flow at the pole 
with the recorded use of electricity over previous periods. The inconsistency should 
have sufficed to get a warrant. 
When Mr. K. conducted his first search to compare the flow of electricity at the meter 
with that at the pole and to "observe other abnormalities" he did not have any 
grounds that a theft of power was taking place. However, the Crown contended he 
did not need this ground as he by virtue of the Tariff and s. 41 of the Hydro and 
Power Authority Act, has free access to private property and any equipment supplied 
with electricity, provided he attends at a reasonable time. This includes the power, 
meter and all wiring. In essence, the Court held that these provisions are not to serve 
the purposes for which they were used in this case. No private person who enters 
into a contract with BC Hydro expects these provisions to mean that BC Hydro 
employees can come on to his/her property and conduct random searches. Such a 
contract is not a waiver of one's rights under s. 8 of the Charter. The Court held that 
the investigator K. and BC Hydro had knowingly been part "of a scheme hatched" by 
the municipal officer for him to circumvent proper and legal procedures. They in fact 
did not act on behalf of Hydro but were agents for the police. The Court held that 
1 1 
had BC Hydro been in a legitimate exercise of their authority under the statute 
applicable to them, and encountered certain evidence that was then reported to the 
police the matter may have been different. 
Expressing concern about a lack of credibility on the part of the authorities the Court 
ruled that the search was a violation of the accused's right under s. 8 of the Charter 
and admitting the evidence in these circumstances would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
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Crown's evidence 
excluded 
MUST UNDER-AGED WITNESS WHO GAVE STATEMENT IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH S. 715.1 C.C. BE ABLE TO RECALL EVENTS OF OFFENCE WHEN 
TESTIFYING? 
REGINA v. TOTEN - 83 C.C.C. (3d) 5 Ontario Court of Appeal 
A seven year old girl told her mother how she had been sexually assaulted by the 
baby sitter, the accused. A police constable and a female social worker videotaped 
an interview of the girl by means of a camera that was in a fixed position on the other 
side of a one-way mirror, in such a way that all three parties were on camera all 
during the interview. There was a discussion that showed the girl knew the 
difference between a lie and the truth. She was asked what she had told her mom 
about the assault and was then asked to relate what had happened. Anatomically 
correct dolls were used to assist her in telling her version of events. At the end the 
girl confirmed that what she said was the truth. The interview took place 2 1 /2 days 
after the event in question. 
At trial the videotape was ruled admissible in evidence. It was played for the jury and 
in testimony the girl confirmed that what she told the officer and the social worker did 
in fact happen. This happened in the wake of the girl breaking down while questioned 
by Crown Counsel and being unable to respond to the questions due to emotional 
upset. The jury had been permitted to view the tape in the jury room during their 
deliberations. The accused appealed the conviction that followed, claiming that the 
tape was not admissible in evidence due to the unconstitutionality of s. 715.1 of the 
Criminal Code. 
It is a principle of fundamental justice that an out-of-court statement by a witness 
offered as proof of the truth of its content, must be tested for reliability and its 
admission must be a matter of necessity. Section 715.1 of the Criminal Code which 
the Crown relied on to have the taped interview admitted in evidence, does not 
include a reliability or necessity test prerequisite to admissibility of out-of-court 
statements. The section simply says that a videotaped interview of an underaged 
witness that took place within a reasonable time after the events in question, in which 
that witness describes the offensive acts he/she complains of is admissible in 
evidence provided the witness testifies to adopt the content of the taped interview. 
The exclusion of the tests mentioned above renders the section to be inconsistent 
with s. 7 of the Charter and consequently it is without force or effect argued defence 
counsel. He offered the opinion that this inconsistency was not salvageable by s. 1 
of the Charter. 
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The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the defence arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of the impugned section. It reminded the defence counsel that 
section 715.1 C.C. does not create an exception to the hearsay rule but an exception 
to the rule that evidence of prior consistent out-of-court statements are inadmissible. 
The tests of reliability and necessity apply to the former and not to the latter category 
of evidence. 
The Court also held that the section does not inhibit an accused from making a full 
answer and defence in accordance to s. 11 (d) of the Charter. The adoption of the 
content of a tape must be done by means of testimony. This gives the defence an 
opportunity to cross examine the complainant in regard to the tape content or any 
other relevant issue. 
There was also no fault found with the jury taking the tape into the jury room. The 
jury had been properly instructed about the probative value of the taped interview and 
the view of both counsel had been solicited and they had agreed that the jury should 
have it available to them during their deliberations. 
The section leaves some questions unanswered. For instance it is totally silent on the 
purpose for which the taped statement is admissible. It could be admissible strictly 
to assess the credibility of the witness; to show that the statement was made; or for 
it being evidence of the truth of the statement's content. The Court had no trouble 
to hold that it is admissible as evidence of the truth of its content. Why else would 
the complainant have to refer to the statement in his/her testimony and adopt it as 
true and thereby incorporate that statement in his/her testimony. 
The Court held that the word "adopt" in the section includes two aspects of the 
witness's testimony: he/she acknowledges to have made the statement and that 
his/her memory while testifying is in accord with the content of the statement. At 
this juncture of judicial reasoning there is conflict, over the meaning of "adoption". 
Evidence is secured frequently by jotting down. information while we still can 
remember details, events or witnesses. The police officer's notebook is a prime 
example as are a witness's scribbling of a licence number; the information the 
inspector writes on the inspection form, etc. At the time that person testifies he/she 
may not recall the details of his/her notes, but vouching that the notes were made at 
the time or when the recollection of things noted were still fresh in his or her mind 
and were accurately recorded will cause the evidence to be probative. 
This doctrine of "the past recollection recorded" was created by the British Courts in 
the early part of this century. It made the testimony of a London tramcar inspector 
admissible and his safety-inspection form that he in his testimony adopted as an 
accurate and truthful notation of what he found during his inspection, evidence of the 
truth of its content. This despite the fact that he only had a vague memory of the 
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inspection. He testified that he routinely filled in these forms and always insured the 
form truly reflected the condition of the car. 
Some of Courts have applied this doctrine to s. 715.1 C.C. when the child-witness 
could at the time of testifying, not recall all of the events contained in the statement 
recorded "within a reasonable time after the alleged offence". Those Courts held that 
if the child testified that they had told the truth when they made the statement then 
the witness had adopted the statement in terms of the truth of its content. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, like at least one of its counterparts, said: 
"In my opinion, it would be a rare case where the 
complainant could recall making the statement about the 
alleged assault, but not the actual assault which occurred 
shortly before the making of the statement. I say it would 
be a rare case because the events referred to in the 
statement are hardly of the routine sort which could be 
expected to pass from one's memory although a 
recollection of recording those events remained." 
In essence recollection of the events amounting to the assault are an essential element 
of "adopt", as the verb is used in s. 715.1 C.C. Vouching for having been truthful 
as we do to meet the doctrine of past recollection recorded, is distinct from adopting 
a prior out-of-court statement. To adopt such a statement one must verify the 
accuracy of the statement from the memory of the events and be subject to cross-
examination on the remembered events. To vouch for the accuracy of a previous 
statement is simply testifying to have been truthful in noting events one can now no 
longer remember . Where the doctrine of recorded resolution applies "vouching" is all 
that is required. However, where "adoption" is called for recollection is essential. 
This reasoning caused the Crown representative to ponder what purpose this 
legislation serves if the complainant "must be able to recall the actual events and 
articulate them on the witness stand". 
The Court responded that the provisions contained in s. 715.1 C.C. do not usurp 
other rules of evidence but "takes its place alongside those rules and procedures". 
The video taped statements are only admissible to the extent that it "describes the act 
complained of", provided the witness adopts the statement. This includes that he/she 
acknowledges the making of the statement and that the witness is able, "based on 
a present memory of the events referred to in the statement" to vouch for the 
accuracy of the content of the statement. Parts the witness cannot remember must 
be edited out if they are prejudicial to the accused. Furthermore, the content of the 
statements referred to in s. 7 15. 1 C.C., must comply with the rules of evidence . 
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Only the acts complained of are made admissible by the section. All other things not 
directly "encompassed" by the indictment or hearsay or conversations which are not 
part of those acts, are simply not admissible. Nothing in a videotaped statement· by 
an under-aged person is admissible in evidence unless it would also be admissible if 
adduced without the assistance of s. 715.1 C.C. 
Furthermore, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that s. 715.1 C.C. does not usurp any 
judicial discretions to exclude evidence that is causing relevant evidence to have a 
negative effect on the fairness of a trial. Section 7 of the Charter would be violated 
ifs. 715.1 C.C. is mechanically applied to admit such evidence. It is an exclusionary 
principle that relevant and otherwise admissible evidence is inadmissible where the 
prejudicial effect to the trial process outweighs its probative value. 
With regard to cross-examination of the under-aged witness who made an out-of-
Court video taped statements. 715.1 C.C. refers to, the Court said that if it held that 
the witness need not recall the actual events, it would effectively cause the section 
to be inconsistent with an accused's right to make a full answer and defence. You 
cannot cross-examine a witness on something he/she cannot remember. 
The Crown has a choice when it uses a videotaped out-of-court statement by an 
under-aged witness. It either uses the statement to refresh the witness's memory or 
it adduces the tape in evidence under s. 715.1 C.C. The Court held that either way, 
the cross-examination of the witness is the same (Of course, where it is used to 
refresh memory only the jury does not get to see the tape}. 
The Court held that s. 715.1 C.C., providing it is used as outlined above, is not 
unconstitutional. 
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Accused' s conviction 
upheld 
YOUTHS IN POSSESSION OF GOODS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN STOLEN -
OBJECTIVE GROUNDS, AND SUBJECTIVE BELIEFS OF THOSE GROUNDS -
LAWFULNESS OF ARREST - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. T.A.C. - H.J.E.S. - W.S.L. (V.0.A.) - BC Court of Appeal, Vancouver 
CA017291, July, 1994. 
A sheet metal worker, Mr. B., was working on a house when he heard three boys (the 
accused) talking about what they "got", such as a VCR, ghetto blaster, etc. All three 
carried back packs that appeared to be stuffed. He assumed from what he heard that 
they had just broken into a home. He phoned 911 on his cellular phone and continued 
to speak to the dispatcher until police, guided by the dispatcher, arrested the three 
accused. What was found on them matched what a home owner, reported missing 
from his home. When police attended to his call they had all the property that was 
taken from his home, with them. 
The Provincial Court trial judge acquitted the accused trio because the arrest had been 
unlawful, the search and seizure unreasonable and admission of the evidence thereby 
obtained would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The Crown appealed 
to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
The search of the back packs had been warrantless and therefore unreasonable, 
unless the Grown showed that it was not. 1 One way of doing so is showing that the 
searches were incident to lawful arrests. However, at trial the arresting officer could 
not clearly remember if the search followed the arrest or vice versa. Nonetheless the 
trial judge had found as a fact that all three accused had been arrested prior to the 
search. Firstly, the trial judge had dealt with the objective test to determine if the 
arrest was lawful. She found as facts that the officers were unaware that a break-in 
had occurred in the neighbourhood when they arrested the accused. The informer 
(the sheet metal worker) was unknown to them. This informer had said that he saw 
three boys in the residential area and one of them had said, "I got a VCR" and the 
other, "I got a ghetto-blaster". When the trio saw they were being followed they had 
ran, jumped a fence and dropped a ghetto blaster. When they apparently thought to 
be free of their pursuers they had looked at the items in their back-packs. All of this 
would raise suspicion with anyone but is far short of reasonable and probable grounds 
required to effect a lawful arrest. Had the trial judge reasoned. 
1 Hunter v. Southam Inc. - Volume 18, page 12 of this publication 
Regina v. Klimchuk - Volume 40, page 19 of this publication 
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The Crown had not at any time adduced evidence that the officers subjectively 
believed they had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused youths. If 
the officers would have had this belief "urgency" could have been relevant and have 
come into play. Apparently the trial judge did not draw the inference from the officer 
having effected the arrests that they also had the requisite subjective belief to be in 
a position to arrest. 
Although there was merit in the Crown's argument that the objective test had been 
met and that the officers did have, in fact, the reasonable and probable grounds to 
effect the arrest, without the subjective belief, the arrests were unlawful held the BC 
Court of Appeal. This made the search of the back packs unreasonable under s. 8 of 
the Charter. In the circumstances the reasonableness of the searches hinged on the 
lawfulness of the arrests. 
The BC Court of Appeal held however, that despite the unlawful arrest and 
unreasonable search the evidence found as a result should not necessarily have been 
excluded. The trial judge had erred in law as well as in fact. She should have 
considered if admitting the evidence would have affected the fairness of the trial. 
Also the seriousness of the offence alleged and the consequences of exclusion should 
have been considered. 
In the well known and trendsetting Collins2 case, the Supreme Court of Canada held, 
"Real evidence that was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter will rarely 
operate unfairly for that reason alone". Real evidence that existed irrespective of the 
Charter violation, does not render a trial unfair. 
The trial judge had held that the unlawful arrest had been used as a means of 
conducting an investigation. That, she had considered , was a serious breach of a 
Charter right of the evidence thereby obtained should be excluded to uphold the 
integrity of the administration of justice. 
This reasoning by the trial judge was in error. The officers were not in error, held the 
BC Court of Appeal. The officers were not acting on suspicion alone. The accused 
had not been compelled to produce evidence against themselves and police had not 
used a camouflage manoeuvre to gain the evidence (like a random sobriety stop of a 
person to see what is in clear view in his/her car). 
2 Regina v. Collins - Volume 27 , page 1 of this publication 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
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The objective grounds for the arrests were not mere susp1c1on, police had 
"compelling" evidence that the accused had stolen property in their possession. The 
BC Court of Appeal held that these matters and the admissibility of evidence should 
be reconsidered with attention being paid to their corrections about the law and facts. 
Crown's appeal allowed, 
new trial ordered . 
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SELF DEFENCE - IMMINENCE OF HARM -
APPREHENSION OF FUTURE HARM -
- EXCESSIVE FORCE - RETREAT 
REGINA v. LAVALLEE3 [1990) 1 S.C.R. 852 - Volume 38, page 9 of this publication; 
REGINA v. PETEL - [1994) 1 S.C.R. 3; REGINA v. IRWIN - Court of Appeal for BC, 
Victoria, V01720 
The excuse of self defence, when one has caused injury or death to another person, 
is drastically being changed by the judiciary. The meaning and interpretation of s. 34 
of the Criminal Code is amended without the involvement of Parliament. The common 
law and the application of that section has always been that one is excused in 
repelling an assault only after having retreated as far as is reasonably possible, that 
the repelling force may not be excessive and that the harm, subjectively, must be 
imminent. Future harm was not included in what excused a person from criminal 
liability, when he/she used force on the person who would inflict that harm. This 
changed in 1990 by means of a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina 
v. Lavallee. 
Regina v. Lavallee 
Ms. Lavallee and her common law husband entertained a number of guests at their 
home. The husband was very abusive and hospital records revealed at least eight 
emergency treatments of Ms. Lavallee due to injuries inflicted by the husband. On 
this occasion the husband did send Lavallee to her bedroom as she was impertinent 
to him in front of the guests. He followed her shortly afterwards and assaulted her 
and the guests could hear the screaming and thumping. He reminded her that she 
was his "old lady", and she was to do as she was told. He promised that she would 
"get it" as soon as all the guests were gone. He then gave her a loaded rifle and said, 
" .... you either kill me now or I'll get you". He then turned around and walked towards 
the door. She shot him in the back of the head and was consequently tried for 
second degree murder. A jury acquitted Lavallee, the Court of Appeal for Manitoba 
ordered a new trial, and the Supreme Court of Canada restored the acquittal. The 
heart of the issue was the requirement of imminence, at the exclusion of prevention 
of future harm. 
3 Regina v. Lavallee [1990] 1. S.C.R. 852 - Volume 38, page 9 of this publication. 
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In the Supreme Court of Canada reasons for judgment, the "battered wife syndrome" 
was predominant in the conclusion that no longer does the apprehended danger or 
harm have to be imminent. In fact, the emphasis was so focused on that syndrome 
that it is not an unreasonable inference that the precedent only applies to domestic 
scenes. Needless to say, such a notion is not likely to be correct, as similar fears 
from oppressive and intimidating interaction between persons in all kinds of settings 
can cause emotions similar to those of the "battered wife". This became quite 
apparent when the Supreme Court of Canada, four years later, was confronted with 
the same questions in relation to a murder committed by a person battered in a 
criminal setting and relationship. 
Regina v. Petel 
Mrs. Petel's4 daughter lived common law with E., who was an active drug dealer. 
The couple was evicted from their apartment and moved in with "mom", Mrs. Petel. 
Mr. R., the partner of E. in his illegal trading and marketing, also frequented Mrs. 
Petel's home. E. was very abusive towards Mrs. Petel. She described her life as "a 
terrible existence". E. was always angry and beat her daughter frequently. E. 
threatened Petel with violence and made her accommodate his trafficking and the 
constant flow of customers. To put an end to this horrible lifestyle, she moved. This 
was to no avail as E., without her consent, continued his trafficking operation at Mrs. 
Petel' s new location. 
One day, E. came to Mrs. Petel's home and made her weigh cocaine and ordered her 
to hide a revolver for him. E. "suggested" that he would kill Mrs. Petel, her daughter 
and granddaughter. At this point her daughter came in with Mr. R. E's business 
partner. Mrs. Petel got the revolver E. gave her to hide for him and shot E. R. lunged 
at her and she shot him as well. E. recovered from his wound but R. died. Mrs. Petel 
was convicted of second degree murder, but the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a 
new trial as it saw no distinction between the Lavallee case and the situation Mrs. 
Petel found herself in. The Crown appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (S.C.C.). 
The S.C.C. said that there are three constituent elements to self defence contained 
in the wording of s. 34 C.C. - (1) the existence of an unlawful assault; (2) a 
reasonable apprehension of a risk of death or grievous bodily harm; and (3) a 
reasonable belief that it is not possible to preserve oneself from harm except by killing 
the adversary. To determine if there was an unlawful assault we must not try the 
victim as it is the accused who is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The question 
4 Regina v. Petel [1994] 1 S.C.R. 3. 
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therefore, is not whether the accused was unlawfully assaulted, but "did the accused 
actually and reasonably believe, in the circumstances, that he was unlawfully 
assaulted". Beware, that this includes, according to the definition of assault, an act 
or threat that gives one reasonable grounds to believe that his/her adversary has the 
"present ability to effect his purpose". Consequently, the S.C.C. held that that belief 
must be reasonable, meaning that any ordinary person placed in the same 
circumstances may come to the same conclusion. 
Referring to the Lavallee decision, to determine if it was a precedent regarding the 
defence of self-defence raised by Mrs. Petel the S.C.C. held that it clearly was. The 
Lavallee decision "rejected the rule requiring that the apprehended danger be 
imminent". It said that that rule had come from an assumption that the defender and 
adversary are of equal strength. This assumption can be rebutted by evidence, 
particularly expert evidence, that there was a reasonable apprehension of danger and 
a belief that it could not be extr.icated other than by killing the adversary. However, 
proof that the apprehended danger was imminent is not a formal requirement. 
The S.C.C. in a five to four decision dismissed the Crown's appeal and upheld the 
Quebec Court of Appeal order for a new trial for Mrs. Petel. 
Regina v. lrwin 5 
In the wake of these cases the BC Court of Appeal heard an appeal by James Irwin 
who had been convicted of manslaughter. He also raised the excuse of self defence 
while his apprehended harm was of the future. 
A drug deal went sour and a party by the name of Hanson, the deceased, had felt 
"ripped off" by Irwin. Hanson came to the bus Irwin called home. Hanson was armed 
with a shotgun and allegedly said, "For a quarter you die". Irwin and Hanson 
struggled when Hanson tried to open the door of the bus and managed to put the 
barrel of his shotgun through the narrow opening. Hanson fired his shotgun twice 
during the entire episode but did not do any damage. Irwin, the appellant, fired his 
rifle three times, two times in rapid succession as he rushed out of the door and the 
third time as Hanson was trying to get up and had "growled"-at Irwin. 
Hanson apparently died instantly from the third shot. Irwin and a friend buried the 
body. The next day Irwin saw his lawyer and told him what happened. 
5 Regina v. Irwin - BC Court of Appeal, July 1994, Victoria, BC V01720 
23 
The accused testified at his trial for manslaughter and swore that Hanson had come 
to kill him and that he had to take Hanson's life to preserve his own. However, 
friends of the appellant, including the lady friend who was with him that night, 
testified that the appellant had said that he had to kill Hanson (despite the fact he had 
incapacitated him) with that third and fatal shot. He had reasoned that Hanson would 
recover from his wounds (first and second shot) and be back in six months or so, to 
kill him. 
The trial judge had instructed the jury that self defence does not include future harm; 
that the harm apprehended had to be imminent; that the force used to preserve 
oneself is not to be excessive; and that the person defending him/herself has to have 
retreated as far as is reasonably possible. 
The jury had returned a verdict of guilty and Irwin appealed that conviction to the BC 
Court of Appeal relying on the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Lavallee and 
Petel. Irwin claimed that the jury had received erroneous instructions particularly in 
relation to the apprehended harm having to be imminent. 
The Court of Appeal for BC acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Canada in their 
Petel decision had treated Lavallee as: 
"rejecting any rule that requires the apprehended danger to be imminent" 
However, in Lavallee the Supreme Court of Canada describes the apprehension and 
the actions of Mrs. Lavallee as follows: 
" .... a final desperate act by a woman who sincerely believed that she 
would be killed that night". 
The significance of this, is that in Lavallee there was on the evidence a reasonable 
apprehension of death in the near or immediate future. The jury in this Irwin case was 
confronted with evidence that revealed an incapacitated adversary who received a 
deliberate additional bullet in the head, as Irwin speculated, based on knowing his 
adversary, that he would, be back to kill him after he recovered from the wounds t.hat 
had incapacitated him. The Court of Appeal drew the inference that Irwin's fear that 
Hanson would be back to kill him in future, arose from the fact that he had shot 
Hanson twice and wounded him. The Lavallee case did therefore only apply to the 
third and fatal shot. Irwin's apprehension of death was neither near or immediate. 
Consequently this ground for appeal was rejected. 
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When a person is unlawfully assaulted the excuse of self defence is not one the 
defence has to establish. The burden is on the Crown to show, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that an accused person was not acting in self defence. For self defence under 
subsection (2) of s. 34 C.C. excessive force is not an issue as it is in subsection ( 1) 
of that section. The issue in subsection (2) is whether an accused person has a 
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, and believed on reasonable 
and probable grounds that he could not otherwise preserve himself from such harm. 
This is in essence what the jury had been told. It had also been warned to remember 
that "detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife", 
or as in this case, one looks down the barrel of a shotgun in the hands of an 
adversary. In view of the evidence these instructions were clear and correct held the 
Court of Appeal for BC. 
The defence also attacked the instructions the jury had received regarding the 
obligation to retreat under the rubric of self defence. The Court of Appeal pointed out 
that this obligation is included in the wording of s. 34 (2) C.C. : __ " ... he cannot 
otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm". This, of course, 
refers to the required mind set or belief the accused had at the time of the unlawful 
assault. Hanson was approaching the bus Irwin lived in, with shotgun in hand. There 
was a door on the other end of the bus through which Irwin, the accused, could have 
escaped and could have concealed himself in the surrounding bushes. No one, implied 
the Crown, who only wanted to defend himself, would aggressively jump out of a 
door and expose himself to a person with a shotgun who was there for the sole 
purpose to kill him. 
The defence claimed that this instruction to the jury was erroneously incomplete. It 
should also have been told that "a person need not retreat to the point of giving up 
his house to his adversary before a defence of self defence would excuse his 
actions. " 6 
Although the trial judge had not specifically said that the accused, Irwin, could have 
preserved himself by going out the other door, he did only say that these facts in 
evidence were for them to consider. Although, technically, the instruction was 
incomplete, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. 
The accused's appeal was dismissed. 
Conviction for manslaughter was upheld 
6 Regina v. Deegan (1979) 49 C.C.C. (2d) 417. 
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APPLICATION AND LIMITATION OF RULE OF EVIDENCE 
KNOWN A "RECENT POSSESSION" 
REGINA v. SAUNDERS - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver, CA017540, June 1994. 
The accused and another person, were arrested in a car parked outside a home that 
had just been broken into. Stolen property from the home was found in the car. 
Although he did not own the car he seemed to have it with the owner's consent. By 
means of the application of the rule of evidence known as "recent possession" 7 the 
accused was convicted of breaking and entering and theft. Other than the above, 
there was no other evidence to support the convictions. 
When police investigated the break-in they found two small fires burning in the home. 
The accused was as a result convicted of intentionally and recklessly causing damage 
by fire (s. 434 Criminal Code ) . Needless to say, the rule of evidence that led to his 
convictions of breaking, entering and theft, was questioned for application, and 
"overreach". What is reasonable for a jury to find that the accused did set those fires; 
that he aided or abetted his passenger in setting the fires or did he have an intent in 
common with his passenger to commit the break in knowing that the setting of the 
fires were a probable consequence of that crime? The accused asked these questions 
of the BC Court of Appeal appealing his conviction of causing damage by fire. 
The BC Court of Appeal held the conviction of breaking and entering and theft is in 
the circumstances appropriate. The inference of that guilt, considering the evidence, 
is "unassailable" said the Court. However that same rule of evidence is of no 
assistance to meet the burden of proof on the Crown to prove that the accused by 
any of the three means mentioned above, was criminally liable for the fires. 
Accused's appeal allowed, Conviction 
of causing damage by fire set aside. 
Accused's Appeal re: Breaking, Entering 
and theft dismissed. 
7 Regina v. Kowlyk - Supreme Court of Canada 1988 - Volume 33, page 15 of 
this publication, as well as Volume 25, page 28. 
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"THE DIARRHOEA DEFENCE" 
REGINA v. POWELL - BC Provincial Court - Delta File #19853. 
When "nature" calls, failure to attend to its urging, can have serious consequences. 
In this case responding to its call caused a Mr. P. to be charged with failure to comply 
with a demand for breath samples. He claimed to have an excuse for that failure as 
he was subject to a superior claim to shed another kind of bodily substance. To lay 
a basis for this innovative defence the investigating officer, Cst. Doug Merryman, was 
thoroughly cross examined. He was allowed to express his opinions and observations 
only experts are allowed to give. The officer is an expert because he is human and 
had five children. 
No sooner had the officer arrived at the police station, of the accused asked to use 
the bathroom facilities. The officer, of course, escorted the accused not to lose 
continuity of observation. What he observed and became aware of by means of other 
senses while he shared the "facilities" with the accused was all brought out in cross-
examination. 
The officer was asked to concede, by the sounds he had heard and the odours he had 
smelled, that the accused had had a large, noisy and smelly voiding of the bowels. 
Considering his embedded memories of the event, he wholeheartedly agreed with 
defence counsel. So far so good for the defence. However, the officer disagreed that 
what he heard was "an episode of diarrhoea". When asked how he could have 
concluded this the officer testified that he went by the sounds he himself makes when 
he voids with a rush. Then he volunteered that he was also familiar with the sounds 
one makes when things don't flow that well. 
By now it was clear the accused would claim that his urgent bodily functions had 
prevented him from attending to the breathalyzer obligations he had. This involuntary 
act, surely, amounted to a reasonable excuse. 
Then the issue of expert testimony was raised and it was agreed that to diagnose 
someone else's methods of voiding the bowels by sound and smell, perhaps no one 
is or all of us are experts. The officer, at this stage, testified to have five children and 
had heard many times all the familiar sounds that accompany the various voiding 
processes. Hearing this the Court suggested, "You may be an expert". Defence 
counsel agreed . 
No sooner had the officer and the accused been back in the booking area and the 
accused been supplied with a list of lawyers, he had to go back to the bathroom. 
According to the "expert" officer no attempt had been made that time to have a 
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bowel movement although the accused took the required position for six minutes. 
Here is where defence counsel pounced on our expert. How could he say no effort 
had been made by the accused? Did he not know that when you have the condition 
the accused claimed to have no effort needs to be made? The officer asserted that 
some exertion is required at all times which is noticeable by watching the person's 
eyebrows. "The eyebrows turn red as they gather up all their energies to ..... 
focusing on .... to one area". The officer now had to follow through. The judge 
assured him that he was doing all right and was within the perimeter of the law of 
evidence to elaborate. The officer went on to explain, "The red eyebrows and 
contortions in the face, a reddening as they're focusing their energies can be a normal 
displa\f'of an attempt to void one's bowels". 
He distinguished this from diarrhoea. That comes, he attested "without effort, with 
very distinct sounds, a splashing interjected with bodily air". " It is almost like 
somebody turning on a tap at times and at other times it's sporadic, interspersed with 
bodily air". That, the officer said, was his own experience and that of his family, but 
that is not what he saw or heard from the accused. Upon further drilling by defence 
counsel the officer said he had vivid memories of the smell but there was no 
splashing. Then the cross-examination went on about another symptom the officer 
said was somewhat "vulgar and known as farting". "Air being passed?" inqui_red 
counsel. "Passing wind", responded the expert. The only thing agreed on was that 
the accused had the first time he used the bathroom, a very large bowel movement 
although the content of the toilet bowl had not been examined. 
The second time the accused attended the bathroom the breathalyzer operator 
announced he was ready and the accused was asked to make himself available. "I 
have to take a shit", he responded. "Isn't it true officer, that he said 'I have the 
shits'?" "If that is what he said, that is what I would have in my notebook. I have 
a clear recollection that he said, " I have to take a shit". At this point the accused was 
pressed to come along and stop, what the expert believed, was a faking of inability 
to comply with the breathalyzer demand. It was conceded that the accused never did 
say he would not blow (breath that is) into the breathalyzer. The accused said, "I'm 
not getting off this shitter, I have the flu". 
The trial judge apparently did hot accept the accused's claims as she convicted him 
of failing to supply breath samples. 
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OFFICER CONDUCTING WARRANTLESS SEARCH - RELIANCE 
ON A PRECEDENT UNDER APPEAL - PRECEDENT REVERSED 
"GOOD FAITH" ON THE PART OF THE OFFICERS 
REGINA v. SENEY - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 013504 
Police investigated a break-in in the accused's neighbourhood. The investigating 
officer canvassed the neighbours including the accused. As he walked up to the 
house the smell of marihuana was unmistakable. As the accused opened the door to 
talk to him the officer confirmed the smell came from the house. The officer notified 
the drug squad of his suspicions and that he had observed how the basement 
windows were boarded up which he knew to be a sign of cultivation of marihuana. 
He notified Detective T. of the Drug Squad who conducted a warrantless perimeter 
search under the search provisions of the Narcotic Control Act. He looked through 
the vent in the basement and could clearly see the marihuana plants. A search 
warrant was obtained and executed and consequently the accused was charged with 
cultivation and possession of marihuana. 
What Officer T. did (the warrantless perimeter search) in March of 1990 had been 
found to be "reasonable" by the BC Court of Appeal in 19888 in terms of s. 8 of the 
Charter. The officer was very much aware of this decision but conceded also to know 
that this Court of Appeal decision was under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In January of 1991, the S.C.C. reversed the BC decision9 • (Since then the S.C.C.10 
reiterated their views at least in two other cases, not distinguishable from the Kokesch 
decision). The accused was tried after the Supreme Court of Canada decision and 
consequently Detective T's warrantless search was found to have infringed the 
accused's right to be secure of unreasonable search or seizure under s. 8 of the 
Charter. 
8 Regina v. Kokesch - Volume 33, page 41 of this publication - 46 C.C.C. (3d) 
194. 
9 Regina v. Kokesch - Volume 39, page 6 of this publication - 61 C.C.C. (3d) 
191. 
10 Regina v. Grant - Volume 45, page 1 of this publication, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 
161. 
Regina v. Grant - Volume 45, page 7 of this publication, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 
203. 
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Needless to say Detective T. had conducted the impugned search when it was by 
statute and precedent proper to do so. This, the Crown argued, meant the officer had 
acted, "in good faith". The trial judge held that the officer's awareness of the BC 
decision he was relying on, being under appeal to the S.C.C. precluded him from 
having acted in good faith. He excluded all of the evidence and the accused was 
acquitted. The Crown appealed the exclusion and the verdict of course, to the BC 
Court of Appeal. 
When the officer investigating the break-in reported his suspicions to Detective T, the 
memorandum only said that he suspected, "there was marihuana at the above 
address". That officer was at the front door of the accused's home for a perfectly 
- lawful purpose. What he saw and smelled was enough for a search warrant. 
Regrettably his report did not mention any of those details. However Detective T. did 
not have those details and therefore did not personally have the belief that an offence 
under the Narcotic Control Act was being committed. Consequently the defence 
argued that the officer's knowledge of and reliance on the first Kokesch decision was 
irrelevant. He simply had no grounds at all, even if a warrantless perimeter search 
under the N.C.A. was permitted. Hence the argument of good faith was superfluous. 
Good faith only applies where a searching officer does not only believe to be entitled, 
in law, to conduct the search, but also believes on reasonable grounds that an offence 
under the N.C.A. is being committed. In all the cases (Kokesch, Grant, Plant and 
Wiley11 ) the officers did have those beliefs when they conducted the warrantless 
searches. 
The Court of Appeal for BC disagreed with the reasoning by defence counsel. The 
Court said that its decision in 1988 said, 
"that such searches may lawfully be conducted around a 
residential building without warrant, even when the officers 
involved are not satisfied they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a narcotics offence is being committed within 
the residence, and are seeking evidence on which belief can 
be based so as to able to obtain a warrant to search the 
residence itself". 
It was that decision Detective T. was aware of and relied on when he conducted the 
warrantless perimeter search of the accused's home. As the law was at that time, 
no statutory authority was needed to conduct such a search. S. 10 (1) (a) N.C.A. 
was consequently "inapplicable" in this context and Detective T. was acting in good 
faith. 
11 Regina v. Wiley [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263. 
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With regard to Detective T. knowing that the law (case) he relied on was under 
appeal, the Court of Appeal, relying on the Wiley decision by the Supreme Court of 
Canada said, 
"the Supreme Court of Canada was of the view that the 
police officers acted in good faith .... It held that allowing the 
appeal of Kokesch did not 'turn back the clock' so as to 
impeach the good faith of the officers who conducted 
investigations in the meantime in reliance on the decision of 
this Court". " ... . police officers are not expected to predict 
the outcome of appeals". 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal set aside . 
New trial ordered on all 
issues 
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OFFICERS LACKING BELIEF THAT THEY HAVE GROUNDS 
TO EFFECT AN ARREST. ACCUSED SEARCHED BEFORE ARREST -
UNREASONABLE SEARCH - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. HARPAL SINGH THANDI - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 017451 
A Crime Stopper tip said that the accused would arrive in town on the 7:00 a.m. bus. 
The informer knew this from the person who put him on that bus. The accused would 
be carrying an ounce of pure heroin on his person. The informer was intoxicated and 
claimed to be East Indian like the accused. 
Two police officers with very little drug work experience met the bus at 7:00 a.m. 
There were two East Indian men on board. One did not fit the detailed description 
given by the tipper at all, the other did fit it in every conceivable detail. Another 
peculiar aspect of the accused was that he wore a heavy leather jacket on this warm 
day in July. 
The accused made a telephone call and left the bus station. The officers approached 
the accused, did not ask for his name (in spite of the fact police were given the 
suspect's name by the informer), but asked him to come over to the car for a 
discussion. He was asked if he had any drugs on him and what the large lump was 
in the front pocket of his jacket. The officers reached in and retrieved an object 
wrapped in tinfoil. The accused said it was "coke". He was arrested, warned and 
Chartered. The substance was found to be heroin. The accused also gave the 
officers an inculpatory statement. He said that the heroin and a small quantity of 
cocaine were for him to transport and deliver to another person. He was fully aware 
what he was carrying. 
The officers testified that they had not thought to have enough grounds to effect an 
arrest until the accused had said the . substance found on him was cocaine. This 
meant that the search was not incident to the arrest. A search without an arrest 
requires the same grounds as an arrest, to be lawful. The officers not having the 
subjective belief they could have lawfully arrested the accused, caused the search to 
be unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. Consequently the trial judge was urged 
to exclude all of the evidence including the statement the accused had made. He 
declined to do so as the evidence was real and the violation was not a serious one. 
However, the statements were excluded as they were the result of the unreasonable 
search and that admission would affect the fairness of the trial. The accused 
appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
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Needless to say, objectively the officers had sufficient grounds to have arrested the 
accused before searching him. Counsel for the accused urged the Court of Appeal to 
hold that lack of subjective belief should be carried forward to a s. 24 Charter 
exclusion of evidence. The Court refused to do so and would not interfere with the 
trial judge's decisions. This would be a different matter had there objectively been a 
lack of grounds. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Note: 
The reasons for judgment do not mention anywhere what the arrest was for or what 
the accused was convicted of. Imagination and the above facts have to fill in that 
omission. 
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DEFENCE OF POLICE HARASSMENT TO SPEEDING 
REGINA v. LANGSTON - BC Court of Appeal, Vancouver CC 931699. 
Ms. L. was tried for speeding by an Justice of the Peace and was found guilty. She 
appealed her conviction to the BC Supreme Court. 
The evidence was that she was proceeding on a multi-laned freeway and was 
catching up rapidly to a police car, and overtaking it. The radar set registered her 
speed at 103 km per hour in a 80 km zone. The officer then paced the accused's car 
in a lane adjacent to the one she was travelling in. She increased her speed to 116 
km per hour, but was then in a 90 km zone. 
Ms. L. denied speeding but said that if she did it was in response to fear and 
insecurity "instilled by the officer's negligent and unprofessional handling of the 
situation." It was dark and the police car was unmarked. When the officer had 
started to drive along side of her for a distance of about 3 km, she had become 
alarmed and may have increased her speed to get away. She said the officer's 
method had amounted to intimidation and harassment. Speeding was her response 
and that should not have resulted in a conviction. 
The Supreme Court Justice said that she might have reached a different conclusion 
had she presided over the trial. However, it was not this Court's function to retry this 
case. The Court said it was for the trial judge to weight the evidence and that 
evidence supported the charge. 
Appeal dismissed. 
37 
38 
DEFENCE APPLICATION FOR INFORMER'S CRIMINAL RECORD 
TO TEST VALIDITY OF NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT SEARCH WARRANT 
REGINA v. KELLY - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC 930757. 
Acting on confidential and reliable information from a human source a police sergeant 
was granted a search warrant under the Narcotic Control Act. The accused's home 
was searched and the narcotics on which the charge against him was based were 
found. 
In cross-examination, the sergeant was asked to tell what he knew of the informer's 
criminal record and applied to the Court for disclosure of that record. The defence 
counsel requested that the trial judge edit that record so it would not reveal the 
identify of the informer. To the latter suggestion the Court responded that both 
objectives could not be met by editing the criminal record of the informer. It would 
indirectly reveal the identity of the informer the Court was obliged to protect. 
Defence counsel argued that the credibility of the informer cannot be accepted by the 
Court or the defence simply on the opinion of a police witness. At the time of the 
application the applicant for the warrant must have such belief. His belief afterwards, 
because things have turned out the way the informer said it would, is not the belief 
that validates the warrant. The issuing Justice of the Peace should have been 
informed of the informers criminal record. For instance, convictions for perjury should 
have considerable weight when a Justice of the Peace grants the invasion of the 
privacy of a person based on the reliability of an informer so convicted. All such 
information must be disclosed to the Justice of the Peace to ensure true judicial 
discretion. In a case like this, the applicant's beliefs in regard to the reliability of an 
informer carry little weight as the validity of the search warrant is tested on the basis 
of the reasonable grounds the informer provided, argued the defence. 
The Court responded by telling defence that a warrant to search is a judicial licence 
that is not invalid until the Crown proves its validity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Issuance is the result of a judicial process and it must be presumed that it was valid. 
If an accused person wishes to attack any aspect of such a warrant the onus is on 
him to show it on a balance of probabilities and that as a consequence the issuance 
of the warrant was invalid. 
In this case the defence applied for the Supreme Court trial judge to review the issuing 
judge's decision. This review is limited to determining "whether there was evidence 
upon which the Justice of the Peace acting judicially, could have determined whether 
a search warrant should be issued". If there was evidence before the issuing judge 
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that provides reasonable grounds 'to believe' then that ends the matters unless there 
is evidence before the reviewing judge of fraud, misleading evidence or non disclosure. 
Where information of an informer is relied on for reasonable grounds, special 
requirements must be met. The applicant must not reveal the identity of the informer. 
To satisfy the Justice of the Peace that the informer is reliable the applying officer 
does dispose to that fact and should provide information to support his belief. The 
Justice of the Peace must then consider, based on all of the information deposed to 
if the applying officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the accused 
"was committing the offence alleged". The information supporting the officer's belief 
that the informer is reliable, may consist of the details of the "tip"; the informer's 
knowledge: the indicia of the informer's reliability "based on past performance or 
confirmation from other investigative sources". 
Needless to say, the accused has access to all information that was given to the 
Justice of the Peace. If the criminal record was not revealed by the applicant it was 
not done to deceive but to not identify the informer. Deliberate and deceptive 
withholding of evidence would cause a search warrant to be set aside at trial; 
inadvertent omissions will not result in setting the warrant aside unless the omission 
causes the application to be so incomplete in terms of its validity that the warrant 
cannot stand. 
The Supreme Court trial judge examined the application for the search warrant and 
found that there was sufficient information to justify the issuance of the impugned 
warrant. That the informer has a criminal record would not have lessened the grounds 
the Justice of the Peace found there were. That informers have criminal records does 
not come as a shock to anyone in the criminal justice system. That gives them 
credibility in the underworld and that is why they can move around freely. Generally 
informers are not fine upstanding citizens. Even if what they tell police is a lie and it 
is later discovered to be a lie, the warrant need not fail unless the affiant knew or 
ought to have known that the informer lied. What is far more important than the 
informers criminal record is his record for reliability and if police have been able to 
confirm some aspects of the information he gave police. What is critical is not the 
motive of the informer but the reliability of the information supplied by him. Said the 
Court: 
"In my opinion the interests of society in the administration of justice and the 
protection of the informer, far outweigh the interest of the accused's privacy and in 
the revelation of the identity of the informer ." 
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Application for disclosure 
of informers criminal 
record dismissed 
POLICE ARRESTING ACCUSED IN VAN REPORTED 
TO BE INVOLVED IN COCAINE TRAFFICKING -
LAWFULNESS OF ARREST 
REGINA v. RIMMER - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 016819, April 22, 1994 
Police received information from a reliable source that a van of certain description and 
licence number would be used by a Mr. H. to deliver cocaine. Police did spot the van 
and started to follow it. Surveillance was lost for a period of approximately two 
hours. Then it was seen parked in a private driveway, with the driver behind the 
wheel with the engine running. As two officers approached the van one male person 
came out of the house. When he saw the officers, that person very abruptly went 
inside again. 
The accused was the driver of the van and he was asked for the usual documents. 
As he produced them the accused was then seen to surreptitiously move his hand and 
secret something in his pocket. One officer grabbed the accused's wrist and found 
a deck of cocaine in his hand. The accused was then arrested for possession of 
narcotic and subsequently convicted. He appealed this verdict to the Court of Appeal 
for BC. 
The accused claimed that the evidence against him was discovered by means of an 
unlawful arrest. The accused was arrested when the officer grabbed the accused's 
wrist. At that time the officer did not have the grounds prerequisite to a lawful arrest. 
How could he have a true subjective belief that what the accused was placing in his 
pocket was a prohibited substance, the possession of which amounts to an indictable 
offence? The warrantless arrest would have been lawful if the accused had 
knowledge that the accused had a narcotic in his pocket. 
The Court of Appeal responded that if there was actual knowledge on the part of the 
officer, belief is irrelevant. The crucial question is whether the officer had belief and 
reason to believe that the accused had a narcotic in his possession when he grabbed 
the accused's wrist. In other words did the officer have the reasonable and probable 
grounds for his belief, subjectively and objectively. 
The Court of Appeal found that subjectively the officer believed that the accused 
possessed a narcotic. Considering the circumstances and what the officer knew, he 
also had, objectively, the reasonable and probable grounds to so believe. He knew the 
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source of the information to be reliable and was very much aware of the burgundy 
coloured van being used in the trafficking of narcotics. In addition the van showed 
up at the location the informer said it would. All this is adequate to meet the "Debolt 
test" 12 laid down by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1989. 
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Accused's appeal dismissed. 
12 Regina v. Debolt - Volume 36, page 27 of this publication. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1140. 
WILDLIFE OFFICER STOPPING VEHICLE AND QUESTIONING 
OCCUPANTS - CHARTER VIOLATIONS - ADMISSIBILITY 
OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. MEISE - BC Supreme Court, Prince George Registry 25345, April 1994 
The accused was the passenger in a pick up truck the driver of which carried a rifle. 
The driver was properly licensed to hunt and carry the firearm. 
The accused also had a rifle in the cab of the truck. When a BC Conservation Officer 
asked the accused to produce his firearms licence the accused said he was not going 
to hunt but was headed for the bush to sight-in the rifle. He had assumed that his 
friend's hunting licence would cover both firearms. 
The accused was acquitted of "Carrying a firearm without a licence" under the BC 
Wildlife Act. The officer had failed to warn the accused of his right to remain silent 
and inform him of his Charter Rights and the trial judge had found that the accused's 
answers to the Wildlife Officers questions were not proven to be voluntary. 
Consequently his admissions were inadmissible in evidence. 
The Crown appealed the acquittal to the BC Supreme Court claiming that the test 
used by the trial judge, was erroneous. He had held that the Crown had failed to 
satisfy him that the accused "could reasonably have been expected to think that he 
had a choice whether or not to answer the question" put to him by a man "clothed 
literally .... with authority". The trial judge had also refused to deal with the issue of 
"detention" that triggers the Charter warning. In terms of admitting the statements 
as proof of the truth of their content the issue of voluntariness on the part of the 
accused was also inadequately dealt with claimed the Crown. 
The Supreme Court held that the stopping of the pick up truck does according to the 
Supreme Court of Canada13 constitute detention. The Court also recognized that a 
detained person has a right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter14 although he does 
not have a right to be so informed. 15 
13 Regina v. Thompson and Regina v. Hufsky - Volume 31, page 20 of this 
publication. [1989] 63 C.R. (3d) 14. 
14 Regina v . Hebert - Volume 37, page 16 of this publication, (1990) 57 C.C.C. 
(3d) 1. 
15 Regina v. Van Den Meerssche - Volume 36, page 35 of this publication also 
(1989) 53 c.c.c. (3d) 449. 
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All these cases show that no right of the accused had been infringed. However, the 
Crown is still required to show that the accused was aware of his right to remain 
silent and had an understanding of the consequences of making the statements 
(Hebert decision). Without the "silence" warning or the accused having spoken to his 
counsel, such awareness is very difficult to show. 
The Wildlife Act of BC authorized the officers to stop motor vehicles to determine 
hunting, trapping or angling activities. The accused was "detained" and had a right 
to remain silent but not a right to be so informed. To prove voluntariness as well as 
the accused's rights under s. 7 of the Charter the Crown had to show the above 
mentioned awareness on the part of the accused. In this case the rights of the 
accused had been violated as he failed to appreciate the consequences of his 
utterings. At least there was nothing in the evidence to show such appreciation. 
The Court held that this was not to be the end to the judicial consideration. The 
Wildlife Act creates an offence for failing to stop for a Conservation Officer, failing to 
identify oneself or refusing to give information respecting hunting or fishing. The 
precarious balance between the public interest in preserving society as a whole and 
the individual's liberties and rights is addressed in s. 1 of the Charter. If the 
individual's freedoms and rights are such that the preservation of society is 
jeopardized then one kind of tyranny is exchanged for another. 16 
S. 1 of the Charter stipulates that the law may prescribe reasonable limits to our 
guaranteed rights and freedom where that is "demonstrably justified" in our free and 
democratic society. The provisions of the Wildlife Act of BC does have a specific 
objective and prescribes measures that, on the surface, violate the Charter rights of 
the persons who are subjected to them (arbitrary detention - warrantless searches -
having to supply information) and renders them criminally liable for non compliance. 
Considering our current environmental concerns and the need to protect endangered 
and threatened species these measures are not disproportionate to the objectives of 
that law. Furthermore, enforcing these laws in the vast wilderness of this province 
these measures are minimally impairing the rights of innocent individuals. 
Consequently the Charter breach of this case was demonstrably justified. 
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Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered 
16 Regina v. Bonin - Volume 34, page 1 of this publication, (1989), 47 C.C.C . 
(3d) 230. 
ROADSIDE SCREENING DEVICE TEST -
VALUE AND VALIDITY OF DEMAND IF NO DETERMINATION 
WAS MADE REGARDING ALCOHOL IN THE SUSPECT'S MOUTH 
REGINA v. KEAN17 - Supreme Court of BC, Vancouver CC 931164 
A police officer demanded from the accused that he supply a sample of his breath 
forthwith for the purposes of analysis in a roadside screening device. The accused 
had obviously no intention of providing such a sample, although he made apparent 
attempts which seemed to have been intentionally ineffectual. He was charged with 
failure to provide such a sample and was acquitted. The police officer had not asked 
the accused when he had his last drink and had not waited 15 to 20 minutes for any 
possible residual alcohol in the accused's mouth to dissipate. This failure had 
invalidated the demand for the roadside breath sample, the trial judge held. 
Consequently the accused was acquitted and the Crown appealed this verdict to the 
BC Supreme Court. 
The Court agreed that failure to ensure that there is no residual alcohol in a suspect's 
mouth may well affect the weight if any, of the evidence of a "fail" result of a 
screening device test. Where that "fail" result is the exclusive grounds for the 
breathalyzer demand, it may be found wanting for that purpose. However, the Court 
held that not determining the time of the last drink or that residual alcohol may for 
other reasons be in the suspect's mouth, does not invalidate the demand for roadside 
screening device test. 
The officer's demand for a breath sample for the screening device was therefore valid 
and the accused had failed to comply. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
17 See also, Regina v. Bernshaw - Regina v. Gartrell and Regina v. Elder in 
Volume 44, page 48 of this publication. 
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POLICE ATTENDING AT THE HOME OF THE REGISTERED OWNER 
OF CAR INVOLVED IN A SUSPECTED IMPAIRED DRIVING OFFENCE -
NOT UNREASONABLE SEARCH -
REGINA v. JOHNSON18 - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA016210, April 
1994. 
The accused's car was being driven erratically on a public highway. A citizen phoned 
police and reported the driving and gave a description of the car and its licence 
number as well as its direction of travel. The information given out by the police 
dispatcher included the name and address of the registered owner of the car. When 
police were unable to intercept the car they attended the accused's home and found 
the car bearing the reported licence number parked near a house at the end of a long 
driveway (3/4 of a kilometre). The house and car were not visible from the road. 
The accused was found in the car drinking an alcoholic beverage in the company of 
another person. The car engine was running. The accused refused to comply with 
a demand for breath samples. She was issued an appearance notice and was 
convicted of care or control while impaired and refusing to blow. Her appeal having 
failed in the BC Supreme Court she now appealed her convictions to the BC Court of 
Appeal. 
The defence challenged the authority of police to enter the private property and secure 
evidence leading to the accused's convictions. Based on the judgment by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Kokesch 19 the accused claimed that the police action 
on her private property had amounted to an unreasonable search in violation of her 
rights under s. 8 of the Charter. Consequently none of the evidence police obtained 
while on the property was admissible. 
The Court held that the Kokesch case was distinguishable from this one. In Kokesch 
police had, without prerequisite grounds in evidence, surreptitiously searched around 
a dwelling house to determine if marihuana was being cultivated inside the house. 
The evidence adduced at the trial of Kokesch could only support the finding of mere 
suspicion on the part of the officers who conducted the search. 
18 Volume 44, page 27 of this publication - Appeal to BC Supreme Court. 
19 Regina v. Kokesch ( 1991) 61 C.C.C. (3d) 207 - Volume 39, page 6 of this 
publication. 
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That was not the case here, held the BC Court of Appeal. The driveway was an 
implied invitation for anyone to enter the property. Police did so to investigate the 
report of an apparent impaired driver and found the accused in a state of intoxication 
in care or control of her car. She was charged and convicted of that crime on her 
private property. In view of the information they had they attended to make inquiries 
about the erratic driving. The accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
relation to that. The BC Court of Appeal found support for this view in s. 77 ( 1) of 
the BC Motor Vehicle Act which requires any person who has been involved in a 
violation of "this Act" is compelled to furnish all information a peace officer may need 
and require. 
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Appeal dismissed, 
Convictions upheld. 
IS A "FIREARM" ALWAYS INCLUDED IN THE 
DEFINITION OF WEAPON? 
REGINA v. FELEWKA20 - [1993) 4. S.C.R. 199. 
The accused used the public transit system to go target shooting. He carried his rifle 
with him, wrapped in his jacket. On his way home he used the rapid transit system. 
Two passengers became quite alarmed and alerted transit personnel. When he was 
asked what he had in the jacket and for what purpose he carried a firearm on the 
train, he facetiously replied: "I'm going on a killing spree". He took a connecting bus 
and was shortly after arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. The firearm was a 
.22 calibre rifle and it contained one live round of ammunition. He was tried for 
carrying a concealed weapon as well as possession of a weapon dangerous to the 
publ~,c peace. He was acquitted of the latter charge but convicted of the former. He 
appealed to no avail to the BC Court of Appeal21 and then turned to the Supreme 
Court of Canada (S.C.C.) challenging the propriety of the conviction. 
The two main questions that arose from the appeal was whether a firearm is included 
in the definition of weapon and whether the Crown had proved the mens rea on the 
part of the accused, required for the offence of possession of a weapon dangerous 
to the public peace. The judgment was by majority - six justices upheld the conviction 
and three did dissent. 
The definition of "weapon" in section 2 of the Criminal Code of Canada is "anything" 
used or intended for use in causing death or injury whether designed for that purpose 
or not or anything used or intended for use for the purpose of threatening or 
intimidating anyone and, without restricting the generality of this definition, includes 
any firearm. Needless to say this wording begs the question if a firearm is always a 
weapon. Its own definition does call it "any barrelled weapon". The accused argued 
that the definition of weapon should be interpreted to mean that a firearm is only a 
weapon when it is intended to be used as such. To hold that a firearm is always a 
weapon would render many innocent persons unacceptably vulnerable to criminal 
liability . Concealing a firearm requires no criminal intent other than the intent to 
conceal for whatever reason. Hence the offence ranges from concealing a gun from 
a curious child to concealment to bring a firearm on the scene of a crime unnoticed. 
20 See Volume 42, page 26 of this publication . 
21 See Volume 42, page 26 of this publication . 
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The S.C.C. did recognize the broad spectrum this offence covers but seemed to say 
that this was for Parliament to remedy and hopefully discretion on the part of law 
enforcement personnel would prevent absurdities. 
The Court summed up the variety of purposes for a firearm and how devastating its 
presence in public can be. Again a wide spectrum is covered and ranges from 
collectors, target shooters and hunters to those who use the same implement to 
create mayhem, panic and death or injuries for the sake of enforcing their will on 
others, to take vengeance or overcome resistance to their criminal objectives. Said 
the Court: 
"A firearm is quite different from an object such as a 
carving knife or an ice pick which will normally be used for 
legitimate purposes. A firearm, however, is always a 
weapon. No matter what the intention may be of the 
person carrying a gun the firearm itself presents the 
ultimate threat of death to those in its presence." 
It was also an anomaly that had the .accused lived in Nova Scotia and had carried his 
rifle the way he did he would have been in compliance with provincial laws. In that 
province no firearm may be transported openly. It must be encased or "completely 
wrapped in a blanket". Needless to say that the paramountcy doctrine will favour 
federal law and despite compliance with such a provincial statute, the person could 
nonetheless run afoul of the concealment prohibition in the Criminal Code. 
The accused pointed out to the Court that his reason for wrapping his jacket around 
the rifle was not to alarm the public. He had absolutely no intention of breaking a law 
or injure others. The S.C.C. responded that no such intention was requisite to be 
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. All the Crown is required to prove is: 
"(1) carrying, (2) an object which is a weapon and known 
to the accused person to be a weapon, (3) in such a way 
as to conceal it. That is that he or she intended to remove 
the weapon from the knowledge or observation of others, 
to keep it out of sight or hide it." 
The Court reasoned that although there is something "extremely menacing" by 
someone carrying a "naked" weapon. It is intimidating as the intent and purpose of 
the person carrying the weapon is not known. However, the S.C.C. found that there 
is something more sinister to a concealed weapon. 
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The Court found that compliance with provincial regulations regarding the 
transportation of firearms do not necessarily mean non compliance with this 
concealment prohibition in the Criminal Code. Gun cases are due to their shape 
readily identified by the public as something containing a rifle. If a rifle or shotgun is 
tightly wrapped in canvas or other material so the shape of the weapon is readily 
identifiable is not concealment. Very expensive shotguns used for skeet or trap 
shooting are often carried in a briefcase resembling container. To comply with the 
concealment prohibition it should be marked clearly on the outside of the case what 
it contains. Locking rifles in baggage or trunk compartments of cars in compliance 
with regulations, is not concealment. 
The majority of the Court rejected the accused's arguments that the absence of evil 
intent on his part to break the law or injure others should be an excuse for carrying 
the rifle the way he did. The concealment, after all, had been to prevent alarm on the 
part of the public. In rejecting that defence the Court reasoned that it would have 
been so easy for the accused to comply with the law if he had wrapped and tied the 
rifle so it clearly displayed to the public what he carried. Also the fact that the gun 
was loaded seemed to carry some weight as that fact was mentioned in one breath 
with "wrapped and tied". 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
Note: There was no reasoning that included s. 7 of the Charter and the constitutional 
propriety of an offence that can result in a jail sentence with such a minimal 
criminal intent is required for a conviction, this Court held. It seems the 
majority of the Court realized that and its judgment seemed to say that 
common sense should prevail in the exercise of discretion on the part of the 
police, the selection of cases for prosecution by the Crown and the 
innovativeness on the part of defence counsel. 
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INFORMATION AND SURVEILLANCE GIVING GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING 
PERSONS ATTENDING AN APARTMENT COME OUT POSSESSING MARIHUANA 
VALIDITY OF ARREST OF SUCH PERSON 
REGINA v. ENNS - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA017082, April 1994. 
A Crime Stopper's tip related how a party by the name of Dan was extremely active 
selling marihuana from his apartment. The informing party had purchased marihuana 
from Dan himself. An experienced police officer conducted surveillance on the 
apartment on many occasions and he observed many persons visiting for just a few 
minutes. This was consistent over a considerable length of time and the officer, 
coupling his experience with the information he had been given and his observations, 
came to believe Dan was trafficking in marihuana. On Friday afternoon, a day of the 
week when the traffic through Dan's apartment was the heaviest, the officer arrested 
two persons who had separately, about 15 minutes apart, been in Dan's apartment. 
Both were found to be in possession of small quantities of marihuana they bought 
from Dan. Shortly after this the accused paid Dan a short visit and he was also 
arrested with marihuana in his possession. He was convicted accordingly and now 
appealed that conviction claiming the officer did not have the grounds requisite to a 
lawful arrest. 
The accused submitted no quarrel with the subjective test to determine if the officer 
had the grounds to effect the arrest. There was rio doubt that the officer believed the 
accused had purchased marihuana while in Dan's apartment. However, it was the 
objective grounds he challenged. An hour before two other persons were arrested 
under similar circumstances and they were in possession of marihuana . However, this 
does not give rise of objective grounds for "criminal responsibility" on the part of the 
accused, argued the defence. 
The Court of Appeal held that the circumstances in their entirety had provided the 
officer with subjective belief the accused was in possession of marihuana and 
objectively he had grounds for such beliefs. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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CORRECTIONAL OFFICER EFFECTING ARREST OF ????? AND THREATENING 
SEARCH LAWFULNESS OF ARREST - REASONABLENESS OF SEARCH 
REGINA v. LEJEUNESSE - Vancouver Registry, CA 017452 - BC Court of Appeal, May 
1994. 
An informer who had previously provided reliable information to prison security 
officers phoned the duty officer at a correction institute where an "open house" was 
held. He told how he observed a man purchase balloons at a convenience store, less 
than a mile down the road from the institute. The man had taken the balloons into 
the bathroom and was now heading in the direction of the jail. 
The accused in every detail fitting the description given to the officer, was promptly 
arrested for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking when he arrived at 
the correction institute within a few minutes from the call. He was given the choice 
of voluntarily handing over his contraband or be searched. He retrieved the balloon 
containing marihuana from his underwear and told who it was intended for. 
The accused was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and appealed 
that verdict to the Court of Appeal for BC. He argued that the security officer did not 
have the prerequisite grounds to effect the arrest. Hence the arrest was unlawful as 
was the threatened search incident to that arrest. Furthermore, in view of the 
threatened unlawful search there was no voluntariness on his part when he handed 
over the balloon. The entire procedure constituted an unreasonable search (s. 8 
Charter) and the marihuana should not have been admitted in evidence. 
The BC Court of Appeal held that in the circumstances, the arresting officer had a 
genuine belief based on grounds that the accused had a narcotic (or drug) on his 
person. This caused him to have grounds from a subjective point of view while from 
an objective viewpoint there were grounds for such beliefs as well. The threatened 
search would therefore have been incident to a lawful arrest. It was therefore lawful 
while there was no reason to even consider the reasonableness of the search . 
However, should they be wrong with regard to the reasonableness of the search, 
exclusion rather than admission of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute, held the Court. 
Appeal dismissed. 
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"DETENTION" AT BORDER CROSSINGS 
REGINA v. HARDY - BC Supreme Court - Vancouver, C.C. 9331374, April 1994 
The accused, a 27 year old woman who resides in Houston, Texas arrived at the 
Vancouver Airport from Manila where she had been for three days on a "shopping 
trip". She had no ticket for Houston. She was obviously nervous, seemed to 
deliberately avoid eye contact and gave abrupt answers. This, linked with Manila 
being a "source location", aroused suspicion on the part of the Custom's officer that 
the accused was a courier. The officer coded the accused's card for a secondary 
inspection and being a possible courier. 
In the secondary inspection the answers the accused gave failed to remove the 
suspicion. As a matter of fact the replies intensified the possibility that the accused 
arrived for the purpose of importing drugs. She was then told that her baggage would 
be examined by Custom's officers, as it was the officer's opinion that she might be 
in possession of drugs. The accused did not object. Before the baggage was opened, 
she was again asked some questions about her trip. Also this officer considered at 
the end of all that, that the accused was a "good candidate" to be a drug courier. 
The suitcase was x-rayed but the results were inconclusive. However, the inside 
measurements did not jibe with the contours of the suitcase. The drilling of a hole 
proved that the cavity contained while powder. The suitcase had also been 
considered too heavy for its contents. Two kilograms of white powder that was later 
analyzed to be pure heroin, were found. 
At this stage the accused had been Chartered and warned. At her trial defence 
counsel argued that the right to counsel warning in particular, had come too late. Her 
rights should have followed detention immediately. As soon as she was a suspect 
and sent to secondary inspection she should have been made aware of that right as 
this amounted to a constitutional detention. After the white powder had been found, 
police had attended at the scene, an arrest had been effected and she had been 
Chartered and warned again. 
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In dealing with the admissibility of the evidence found on the accused the Court relied 
on the precedents regarding border searches. 22 These cases indicate that detention 
when it comes to protecting our interests at the borders, is not as quickly triggered 
as it is in other situations. 
These cases, defence counsel argued, indicate that the routine questioning at the 
border or the random custom searches do not constitute detention in a constitutional 
sense. However, where this escalates by being taken out of the normal routine for 
a strip search, then there is a constitutional detention. 
The Court disagreed and pointed out that these precedents indicate that even a strip 
or skin search may not constitute detention in a constitutional sense. Not only does 
every sovereign state have a inherent right to protect its borders but also the 
expectation of personal privacy is much lower in a "border crossing setting" than it 
is in any other situation in dealing with authorities. Said the Court: 
"There was no constitutional detention at least until the 
decision to carry out a search of her person." 
After the white powder was found secreted in the suitcase and before a strip search 
was carried out the accused had been Chartered and warned. 
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The evidence was admitted 
22 Regina v. Rodenbush and Rodenbush - Volume 22, page 20 of this 
publication. 
Regina v. Simmons - Volume 34, page 20 of this publication 
Regina v. Greffe - Volume 37, page 2 of this publication 
ADEQUACY OF POLICE WARNING FOR DRINKING DRIVING 
REGINA v. KOZAK - BC Supreme Court, Victoria, 73036-T, May 1994 
The police were of the opinion that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by 
alcohol. He was thoroughly Chartered and warned. A demand for breath samples 
was made of him and he was given a list of lawyers he could call. He said he did not 
want to call anyone and gave the samples demanded from him. The analysis clearly 
supported the police opinion. 
At his trial a voire dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of the certificate 
of analyses. The accused claimed that he had been inadequately informed about his 
right to counsel. He testified that he had not thought himself eligible for legal aid due 
to his income. From what he was told by the officer it had not been clear that despite 
his income duty counsel would have been available to him. All this happened at 3:00 
a.m. and he had not realized counsel are available on a 24 hour basis. 
The trial judge accepted the accused's testimony, disallowed the certificate in 
evidence and acquitted the accused. The Crown appealed this verdict to the BC 
Supreme Court. 
The trial judge had held that the BC Police warning now used by all BC forces, is "no 
good". It inadequately distinguishes legal aid counsel from 24 hour duty counsel as 
a different option. The Supreme Court of BC held that there are four decisions by BC 
Courts of Superior Jurisdiction that have held that the current police warning is 
meeting the needs of an accused person as determined by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1990. 23 These decisions were binding on the Provincial Court trial judge. 
Furthermore the defence claimed that the lengthy warnings epistle was all read in one 
breath, so to speak and this was undoubtedly confusing. The officer should have 
stopped at every stage and inquired if the accused understood. 
The accused had indicated that he understood the content of the warning and did not 
in any way show that he was confused or that the information was deficient for his 
purposes. 
Crown's appeal allowed, 
New trial ordered. 
23 Regina V. Brydges (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 330 - Volume 37, page 27 of this 
publication. 
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FOREIGN POLICE ARRESTING AND INTERVIEWING 
ACCUSED ON BEHALF AND REQUEST OF CANADIAN 
POLICE - TRIAL IN CANADA - APPLICATION OF CHARTER -
ADMISSIBILITY OF INCULPATORY STATEMENT -
REGINA v. TERRY ".' Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 013910, June 1994. 
A police investigation resulted in a Canada-wide warrant for the accused on a charge 
of second degree murder and on extradition request to the US authorities. The 
accused was known to be at a given address in Santa Rosa, California. 
The officer in charge of the investigation contacted the Santa Rosa Police and 
requested that they question the accused and search his baggage. The accused was 
arrested on an extradition warrant, questioned by a Santa Rosa detective and turned 
over to the Federal US Marshal Service for extradition proceedings. 
The Santa Rosa detective testified in the BC Supreme Court during the accused's 
murder trial. By the US and California rules of admissibility of statements everything 
had been done properly. However, defence counsel argued that the "Miranda" 
warning given to the accused at the time he was about to be interviewed is 
inadequate in terms of timing and content. Right to Counsel is triggered by detention 
under the Charter but not under California rules. 
Also, the Right to Counsel given the accused at the time of the interview referred to 
a local lawyer, while the rights of the accused, who was to be tried in Canada, was 
to be advised of his rights under the Canadian law. The US lawyers were not 
equipped to look after the accused's interest in these circumstances. 
The accused appealed his conviction for second degree murder to the Court of Appeal 
for BC. One of the grounds of appeal was the admissibility of the inculpatory 
statement the accused gave to the Santa Rosa detective considering the defence 
position as outlined above. 
This compelled the BC Court of Appeal to address the issue of the prerequisites of the 
admissibility of evidence obtained by foreign police for their own purposes and that 
is also sought to be admitted in evidence in a Canadian Court; or where foreign police 
have collected evidence on request and behalf of Canadian police. Charter violations 
seem inevitable due to technical distinctions in the way rights and freedoms are 
enforced and applied in other nations. This could adversely effect international police 
cooperation in criminal investigations. After all, our Charter does not have 
"extraterritorial application". 
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The Court rejected the Crown's suggestion that evidence obtained outside of Canada 
is immune from scrutiny under section 24(2) of the Charter. This constitutional 
exclusionary rule was included in our entrenched fundamental law to ensure the 
integrity of the administration of justice. Regardless where the evidence was 
obtained, if the methods used are such that accepting that evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute the discretionary rule applies. After all, if one 
closely examines the wording of s. 24 (2} Charter, its remedial component (exclusion 
of evidence) is not restricted to cases in which rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter have been violated. 
The Court then addressed the application of the Charter and observed that foreign 
police cannot violate the Charter as it applies exclusively to Canadian Federal and 
Provincial governments and their agents. Section 24(2) does provide for this 
eventuality, held the Court, as it clearly includes denial of guaranteed Charter rights 
or freedoms. The 'Court seemed to draw a distinction between those two and did 
hypothesize further on in their reasons that had the accused asked to contact a lawyer 
in Canada and was denied that right then exclusion may have been justified under s. 
24 ( 2} of the Charter. 
As it was, the accused was offered US counsel'Without cost. He clearly waived that 
right while fully understanding his entitlement. Furthermore, reasoned the Court, a 
Canadian lawyer could only have spoken to the accused over the telephone while a 
US attorney would have been better informed to assess the local legalities regarding 
his rights and custody in California. That by the California law the rights and 
warnings were not given to the accused immediately upon his detention was not a 
matter of consequence considering how soon afterwards he received the "Miranda" 
warning. There had been no violation of California law and no one on either side of 
the border had tried to deliberately circumvent the Canadian Charter. 
If no denial of any Charter rights did occur in the course of events leading to the 
giving of the statement, admitting it in evidence could not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
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Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
DEFENCE OF THIRD PARTY HAVING INFLICTED INJURIES AND 
EVIDENCE OF PROPENSITY OF THE THIRD PARTY -
EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF FLIGHT 
REGINA v. ARCANGIOLI - [1994) 1 Supreme Court Reports 129. 
The accused became involved in a fight and was charged with aggravated assault as 
he allegedly stabbed his opponent. At his trial the accused took the stand and 
conceded to the fight and punching the victim but denied stabbing him. He said he 
saw a party by the name of S. stab the victim. The defence then went on to call 
evidence that connected S. with a stabbing earlier the same day. Friends of the 
accused testified and corroborated the accused's version of the fight and stabbing. 
S ... also took the stand, denied stabbing the victim or his propensity for violence the 
accused and his friends claimed he has. 
The trial judge had instructed the jury that the criminal record of Mr. S., the defence 
had adduced in evidence, could only be considered by them to determine S's 
credibility as a witness. It could not be used to determine if the accused's testimony 
that S. had stabbed his (the accused's) opponent was true. Even if S. does have the 
propensity to stab his fellowman, that does not mean that the accused's testimony 
in relation to S. stabbing the victim was probably true. 
The accused was convicted and the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that verdict. 
He then turned to the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) for a review of this dispute 
over the evidentiary value and relevance of S's criminal record. The S.C.C. held that 
the jury should have been told that they were entitled to use the evidence as proof of 
S's disposition and to consider if there was a reasonable doubt that the accused 
stabbed the victim. In other words to assess if S. possibly stabbed the victim rather 
than the accused . 
The accused had fled from the crime scene. The instructions the jury had received 
was that an inference of consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused could be 
drawn by them. However, they were also to keep in mind that sometimes innocent 
people will flee from a crime scene. This was inadequate held the S.C.C. The jury 
must be told that no inference may be drawn where an explanation for it is available. 
In this case it could be inferred that the accused, who admitted to assaulting the 
victim, and took flight, had a consciousness of guilt of common assault only and not 
of aggravated assault. 
Accused' s appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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TIDBITS 
POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT SUITABLE TO BREAK INTO AREAS 
The accused was arrested very shortly after he had been seen breaking into a car. When 
searched a home-made device consisting of wire band in a particular shape was found in his 
pockets. Although he had not used the wire for the break-in, he was convicted of possessing 
a device "suitable for the purpose". An expert had testified that a wire of that size, shape and 
disposition is frequently used for breaking into cars. The accused appealed the conviction to no 
avail. The Supreme Court of BC said, that despite the accused's testimony that he used the wire 
in his job of installing awnings, it was reasonable in the circumstances to draw the irresistible 
inference that the accused used it, also to break into cars. 
Regina v. Wilkinson - Vancouver CA 018174, June 1994. 
* * * * * * 
REMEDY TO LACK OF FULL DISCLOSURE 
The defence requested from Crown Counsel the names of the authors of police reports relating 
to a charge of possession of a stolen vehicle and dangerous driving. Counsel also requested 
witness statements and the identity of anyone with useful information. All counsel received was 
police reports with no identification of the authors. Based on the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Regina v. Stinchcombe24 the trial judge denied the Crown the right to call witnesses 
and consequently the accused was acquitted. On appeal the Alberta Court of Appeal agreed that 
the Crown had failed in its duty to make full disclosure and held that the accused's rights under 
s. 7 of the Charter had been infringed. However, this infringement did not occur during but 
long before the trial. The defence cannot allow an infringement to be perpetrated and then be 
silent to later reap benefit from it. The accused must exercise his/her right to judicial review 
so he can exercise his right to full answers and defence. Those options are available and must 
be used to remedy the shortcoming. Crown's appeal allowed, new trial ordered. 
Regina v. J.S.H. - 83 C.C.C. (3d) 572, Alberta Court of Appeal 
24 (1991) 68 c.c.c. (3d) 1. 
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